

When the first information from Nosenko was presented to Mr. X in disguised form for evaluation by the Deputy Chief, the latter prefaced this action with the following remarks:

"I told Mr. X that I thought it quite possible, in view of his own statements about disinformation, that this was the beginning of a disinformation operation possibly relating to [his] defection."

Thus, Mr. X was encouraged by the Deputy Chief of the Soviet Division to make an adverse judgment on Nosenko's information.

According to the Deputy Chief, Mr. X then had the following to say regarding Nosenko:

*Mr X*  
[redacted] felt, in general and without having the full details necessary to an assessment, that there were indeed serious signs of disinformation in this affair. He felt such a disinformation operation, to discredit him, was a likelihood, as he had earlier said. A KGB officer could be permitted to tell everything he knew, now, if he worked in the same general field as [redacted] had. When told that so far this source had not done anything to discredit [redacted], and had in fact reported that the KGB is greatly upset about [redacted] defection, and asked what he thought the purposes of such a disinformation operation now might be, [redacted] agreed that kidnapping was a likely one, "to arrange an exchange for me." Also, to divert our attention from investigations of his leads by throwing up false scents, and to protect their remaining sources. He also added, "There could be other aims as well. The matter should be looked into. It seems serious to me." He thought the KGB might allow a first series of direct meetings with the KGB officer, to build up our confidence, and then in the next session do whatever the operation's purpose might be (discredit [redacted], kidnap, pass serious disinformation items, etc.).

When Nosenko re-emerged from the Soviet Union in 1964 he was therefore received with deep suspicion. Nevertheless, a conscious decision was made not to disclose to him CIA's suspicion because to do so, it was reasoned, would alert the KGB to the fact that the CIA knew what the Soviets were up to.

On the other hand, therefore, Nosenko was greeted effusively and assured that the CIA welcomed his re-emergence and would amply reward him for his cooperation. On 30 January 1964, we therefore find the following exchange taking place between Deputy Chief, SB and Nosenko:

Nosenko: . . . the only thing I wanted to know and I asked this question, "What should I expect in the future?"

D/SB [redacted]: The following awaits: As I presented it, you wanted to come to the United States and have some job, some chance of a future life, which gives you security and if possible the opportunity to work in this field which you know. Is that correct?

Nosenko: Absolutely.

D/SB [redacted]: *The Director* said yes, flatly absolutely yes, in fact I would say enthusiastic . . . that's the only word to describe it. We talked about, and since this was a business discussion I'll repeat all of it whether it was pleasant or unpleasant. So the next thing will be some details that we spoke about. We talked about the means by which [you] could have a solid career with a certain personal independence. Because of the very great assistance you've been to us already and because of this desire to give you a backing, they will give you a little additional personal security, we want to give you an account of your own, a sum of at the beginning just plain \$50,000 and from there on as a working contract \$25,000 a year. But in addition because of the [redacted] which would have been impossible without your information we are going to add at least \$10,000 to this initial sum.<sup>12</sup>

then liberated following a personal plea from President Kennedy to Khrushchev. Plans were drawn up for an "arrest," strict confinement and hostile interrogation. These plans are worth quoting at length:

Nosenko

The operational and psychological assessments of [REDACTED] suggest strongly that the timing and the staging of the "arrest," and the physical surroundings and psychological atmosphere of the detention could influence [REDACTED] strongly, and if properly done, could go a long way towards "setting him up" for the interrogators. For this reason, we wish to emphasize that apart from the purely mechanical problems involved, every member of the guard force will have an important part to play as an actor.

Briefly, the plot is as follows: On the evening of April 2 (the actual date may yet be moved up or delayed a few days), a team of four or five security officers will pull up to the present safehouse in a van or panel truck. Three of them, all unknown to Subject, will enter the

safehouse, will inform Subject that he is under arrest, slap handcuffs on him, lead him out to the van and hustle him into the rear of it. All of this is to be done as quickly as possible, and with an absolute minimum of conversation. [REDACTED] is not to be allowed to take anything with him, and any questions or requests on his part are to be completely ignored. It is anticipated that he will put up physical resistance and, if necessary, the security guards already at the house can bear a hand; however, if possible it would be desirable that they stand completely apart. What we are after in this initial scene is complete surprise, and also to keep Subject in suspense for as long as possible as to who is perpetrating this outrage on him and why. Therefore, it would be desirable for the new "hostile guards" and the old "friendly guards" at the safehouse not to let on that they know each other.

*Adl  
N Denke*

The van will then proceed to the Detention House. [REDACTED] will remain handcuffed throughout; seated in the rear of the van with three guards he should be unable to see anything of the route. The guards should continue to ignore anything he may say; nor should they speak to each other -- an atmosphere of stony and even unnatural silence is just what we want.

Upon arrival at the Detention House, [REDACTED] is to strip completely and to put on prison attire. Again for psychological reasons, it would be desirable to have genuine prison clothes; failing that, coveralls and slippers without laces, or something along those lines will do. The senior officer at the Detention House should play the part of "warden." He is the one who should explain the "prison rules" to Subject and "assign him to his cell."

For a cell, Subject should have the smallest room in the house. From the description, one of the attic bedrooms sounds about right. It is to be furnished with a cot, a hard chair and a slop pail. Nothing else. The window will be grilles, and there should be a single overhead light bulb (about 60 watts) for illumination. This light will remain on at all times. There should be a screened observation window in the cell door, and Subject is to be under observation at all times that he is in the cell. There is no need for this to be covert; in fact, we want Subject to feel that he is under a microscope. Under no circumstances should the guard talk to Subject, however. The prison routine is to be patterned after the description provided by Prof. Barghoorn of his stay in the KGB prison in Lubyanka. Subject will be made to rise at 0600. He will then be taken to the WC where he will be

allowed to empty his slop pail and wash up (cold water only). Meals will be brought to him, and will follow the following pattern:

Breakfast: weak tea (no sugar), porridge

Dinner: watery soup, macaroni or porridge, bread, weak tea

Supper: weak tea and porridge

After the first few days, this diet may be augmented if Subject is cooperative at the interrogation sessions. Subject is not to receive any tobacco or alcohol. A doctor will be on call at all times if medical treatment is required. There should be a buzzer outside the cell door so that the duty guard can summon help without leaving his post. Some provision should be made for a half hour's outdoor exercise once a day, but this is not necessary for the first few days of detention. Subject is not allowed to lie on his cot after reveille; he may sit on his cot or chair. He may retire at 2200. Every several days he will be required to sweep and mop his cell.

There is to be no use of brutality, threats, or third-degree measures of any kind. However, if resistance is encountered, force is to be used whenever necessary during the arrest or to enforce the prison regulations. Force should be applied as swiftly and efficiently and impersonally as possible, without unnecessary talking, and preferably in total silence. Specific measures will have to be considered for violations of or refusal to follow the prison regulations. For example, the first time Subject tries to unscrew the light bulb, he could be placed in a straitjacket for the remainder of the night. On cleaning days, food will not be brought to him until he has cleaned his cell, and so on. We do not expect Subject to be an easy prisoner, but if we are ready to counter his every move from the beginning, it is not likely that he will give much trouble for very long. Suicide is a remote possibility; constant observation and the ready availability of a doctor should be adequate safeguard.

It might be worth listing our objectives in the security aspects of Phase 3. First of all, we want to be sure that we take Subject by surprise, before he can destroy or swallow anything, or take any defensive measures of any kind. We want to prevent him from escaping or from communicating with anyone. We want to keep him from harming himself. We want no one to know where he is. All these objectives could be achieved by more or less routine security measures. On a deeper level, we would like for Subject to be overwhelmed by the sudden change in his fortunes; we want to exploit the shock to his system when he

learns that he was not really fooling everyone as he thought. Particularly at first we want to keep him as much in the dark as possible as to what went wrong, who are the new people who arrested him, where was he taken, and above all, what is in store for him. In the Detention House, we want to create an atmosphere in which he feels totally cut off from the world, trapped in a situation from which there is no escape, caught in a dismal trap in which he may be stuck for the rest of his life. To this end, we would like for him not even to hear the sound of human speech any more than is absolutely necessary. The section of the house in which the cell is located should be sufficiently well shielded acoustically from the rest of the house so that Subject cannot hear the sounds of voices, laughter, telephone calls, comings and goings, etc. No one should ever so much as smile in his presence. No one except the interrogators should ever talk to him. In addition, it would be well if everyone behaved as if the Detention House were a permanent installation and tried to give Subject the impression (without words) that they had been working there for years and that he was just another nameless and faceless prisoner brought there to rot. Although we are ruling out the use of threats, there is no harm in letting [sic] Subject's imagination do the job for us. The best way to do this is to keep him from getting any clues as to what the true state of affairs is. 31

The above plans were modified slightly by the Office of Security. The chronological record states that ". . . OS does not want the SR Phase 3 to be carried out as originally planned. They desire a heated room for Subject, no slop pail, and no aggressive arrest at night. They propose Subject be lured to [safehouse in] [redacted] during daylight hours for a poly (PL 110 processing) . . . Poly operator would say that Subject was withholding and [redacted] [DC/SB] would be called in." 13

and Confinement, edited by Dr. John E. Rasmussen.)

During April 1966 Nosenko went to considerable lengths to contact Deputy Chief, SB but, after consultation with an Agency psychiatrist, he was sent on 13 May 1966 a note which read as follows:

**Answer "YES" or "NO":**

- 1) Do you admit that you came to the United States on a KGB mission?

YES  NO

- 2) Are you ready to tell us about your KGB mission and how your legend was prepared and taught to you?

YES  NO

Date \_\_\_\_\_ Signed \_\_\_\_\_

If the answers to both questions are "YES" someone will come to talk to you. If not, there is no need to write any more letters. 78

The next major maneuver on Nosenko's part was a hunger strike, in the course of which he lost some forty pounds. RR \*

\* From 174 pounds in November 1965 to his lowest weight of 130 pounds in June 1966.

Deputy Chief, SB  
[redacted], in a series of handwritten notes, set forth the Task Force objective as he saw it: "To liquidate & insofar as possible to clean up traces of a sitn in which CIA cd be accused of illegally holding Nosenko." Further on, he summed up a number of "alternative actions," including:

5. Liquidate the man.
6. Render him incapable of giving coherent story (special dose of drug etc.) Poss aim commitmt to looney bin.
7. Commitment to loony bin w/out making him nuts.<sup>82</sup>

Deputy Chief, SB  
A problem which [redacted] found particularly thorny, to judge by his notes, was posed by the FBI's unwillingness to accept CIA's evaluation of Nosenko.

Our case is based primarily on analysis, not confirmed by juridically acceptable evidence, and this analysis is so complex that it probably could not be made more understandable to laymen than it has been to the FBI, which has largely failed to understand it . . . Action serving the interests of this Agency may run counter to the interests of the FBI, since our basic position on Nosenko is different from the Bureau's,

Deputy Chief, SB's  
The FBI also played a role in [redacted] handwritten ruminations over the value of a bogus "confession" by means of which Nosenko would ostensibly discredit himself:

"Confession" wd lessen zeal of congress for a session w/him. Or wd it? FBI might leak to cong/press that they don't know of conf. And they might object to the whole premise, view their interests. "Conf" wd also provide basis for explanation of removal to another ctry -- if feasible. Q: Cd we fake to FBI (CSCI, all other contacts) squaring only w/top?

[redacted]  
[redacted]

the Director's  
Despite [redacted] expressed preference for returning Nosenko to Soviet hands, [redacted] continued to have misgivings about such a course: Deputy Chief, SB

Danger in the Nosenko case lies not only in holding him, but in bringing his case to public notice again, and especially in allowing the Soviets to regain possession of him. (Our denial of Nosenko to the Soviets, particularly if they are in some doubt about his real status/loyalty, is a form of guarantee that the Soviets cannot take the many damaging actions available to them if they had the body.) The course of action therefore must balance the respective dangers. <sup>84</sup>

to the Director gave little or no indication of the manner in which Nosenko was being handled. It is also important to note that the very long period of time which it took to produce the supposedly definitive report on the Nosenko case

*My X* ↘ was somewhat complicated by disagreements between CIA and the FBI, as well as between SB Division and CI Staff within the Agency. The intra-CIA disagreement stemmed from differing views on the validity of [redacted] information. Whereas SB Division insisted that Nosenko, during his KGB career, had never "served in any of the specific staff positions he has described," 94 [redacted] had in some respects supported Nosenko's claims regarding his KGB service. After a conference with [redacted] (summed up the problem on 29 March: Chief, CI, Chief, SB) *Mr X*

Chief, CI said that he did not see how we could submit a Final Report to the Bureau if it contained suggestions that [redacted] had lied to us about certain aspects of Nosenko's past. He recalled that the Director of the FBI had stated that in his opinion [redacted] himself was a provocateur and penetration agent. On the other hand, most FBI agents have accepted that when [redacted] was speaking on facts known to him he was accurate even though they do not accept most of his hypotheses or inferences drawn from facts. Chief, CI went on to say that if we submitted to the FBI a report on Nosenko in the form we now have it, it would most certainly cause us difficulties. It might cause us to lose whatever impact our report would be able to make on the overall question of Nosenko's bona fides and relationship with other cases. 98

Chief, SB and The disagreements between the Agency and the FBI were never Chief to be resolved as long as Nosenko remained within the jurisdiction of the SB Division and the CI Staff. Within house, [redacted] eventually papered over their differences sufficiently to publish a second, compromise report on the Nosenko case in February 1968. But by then the case had been taken out of their hands, and the report was a dead letter even before it went to press.